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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 10-1913 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
 
v. 
 
WILLIAM L. LUCAS,  
also known as BILLY, 
 
William L. Lucas, 
                            Appellant 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Crim. No. 1-99-cr-00030-003) 
District Judge:  Honorable Maurice B. Cohill, Jr. 
_____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1 
May 12, 2011 
 
Before:  SMITH, CHAGARES and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: August 3, 2011) 
 
_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
 William L. Lucas (“Lucas”) admitted to violating the terms of his supervised 
release and was sentenced to twenty-four months‟ imprisonment to be served 
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consecutively to his existing state sentence.  Lucas then appealed.  His attorney has 
moved to withdraw as counsel pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).  
For the reasons that follow, we will grant the motion and affirm the Judgment of the 
District Court. 
I. 
As we write only for the parties, who are familiar with the facts and procedural 
history of the case, we set forth only those facts necessary to our analysis. 
Lucas pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine base 
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 on January 26, 2000 and was sentenced to ninety-six 
months in prison followed by five years of supervised release.  Lucas served his term of 
imprisonment and was released in July 2007.  On August 5, 2008, while on supervised 
release, Lucas was arrested by the City of Pittsburgh Police and charged with two counts 
each of possession of a controlled substance and possession with intent to deliver.  On 
December 9, 2009, Lucas entered a negotiated guilty plea in the Court of Common Pleas 
for Allegheny County to one count each of possession of a controlled substance and 
possession with intent to deliver.  He was sentenced to five to ten years‟ imprisonment 
followed by ten years‟ probation. 
 As a result of this conviction, the U.S. Probation Office filed a Petition for 
Probation/Supervised Release Action on December 28, 2009, alleging a violation of his 
supervised release.  In his hearing on March 22, 2010, Lucas admitted to violating the 
terms of supervised release by illegally possessing a controlled substance.  Based on this 
admission, the District Court found that he had violated his supervised release and further 
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determined that Lucas‟s advisory guidelines range called for an imprisonment term 
between twenty-four and thirty months. 
Lucas‟s counsel requested that the District Court impose no penalty or, 
alternatively, impose a sentence to run concurrent with his state sentence.  The District 
Court disagreed with counsel‟s recommendation.  It stated that it was bothered by the 
similarity between the federal and state convictions and noted that a concurrent sentence 
would amount to essentially no punishment for the violation of supervised release.  
Accordingly, the District Court imposed a sentence of twenty-four months‟ imprisonment 
to be served after the state sentence. 
Lucas filed a timely appeal, and appellate counsel was appointed for him.  Lucas‟s 
attorney has moved to withdraw and submitted an Anders brief. 
II.  
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742. 
 Anders sets forth “the general duties of a lawyer representing an indigent criminal 
defendant on appeal when the lawyer seeks leave to withdraw from continued 
representation on the grounds that there are no nonfrivolous issues to appeal.”  United 
States v. Marvin, 211 F.3d 778, 779 (3d Cir. 2000).  We implement Anders through Local 
Appellate Rule 109.2, which, in pertinent part, provides: 
Where, upon review of the district court record, counsel is 
persuaded that the appeal presents no issue of even arguable 
merit, counsel may file a motion to withdraw and supporting 
brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), 
which must be served upon the appellant and the United 
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States.  The United States must file a brief in response.  
Appellant may also file a brief in response pro se. . . .  If the 
panel agrees that the appeal is without merit, it will grant 
counsel‟s Anders motion, and dispose of the appeal without 
appointing new counsel.  If the panel finds arguable merit to 
the appeal, or that the Anders brief is inadequate to assist the 
court in its review, it will appoint substitute counsel, order 
supplemental briefing and restore the case to the calendar. 
 
3d Cir. L.A.R. 109.2(a).  To meet the requirements of Local Appellate Rule 109.2, 
counsel must “satisfy the court that he or she has thoroughly scoured the record in search 
of appealable issues,” and “explain why the issues are frivolous.”  Marvin, 211 F.3d at 
780.  However, “[c]ounsel need not raise and reject every possible claim.”  United States 
v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001).  “[A]t a minimum, he or she must meet the 
„conscientious examination‟ standard set forth in Anders.”  Id.  This Court, in turn, asks 
“whether counsel adequately fulfilled” the requirements of Rule 109.2, and “whether an 
independent review of the record presents any nonfrivolous issues.”  Id.   
 When an Anders brief is adequate, we limit our review to the portion of the record 
that is highlighted in the brief.  Id. at 301.  When the Anders brief is not adequate, we 
may undertake a more expansive review of the record.  See id. (consulting portions of the 
record identified by the pro se brief where Anders brief was inadequate).  Regardless of 
the adequacy of the Anders brief, we will grant counsel‟s motion to withdraw without 
appointing new counsel if we determine that the appeal is patently frivolous.  See United 
States v. Coleman, 575 F.3d 316, 321-22 (3d Cir. 2009). 
A. 
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In his Anders brief, counsel raises only the issue of whether the District Court 
imposed an unlawful sentence.  In this case, counsel has fulfilled his obligation set forth 
in Anders by explaining that the District Court‟s sentence was procedurally and 
substantively reasonable, and that no nonfrivolous appealable issues remain.  Lucas has 
not submitted a brief on his own behalf.  As a result, pursuant to Youla, we will limit our 
review to the portion of the record addressed in counsel‟s Anders brief. 
In a sentencing appeal, we “review the sentence under an abuse-of-discretion 
standard” to ensure 
that the district court committed no significant procedural 
error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) 
the guidelines range, treating the guidelines as mandatory, 
failing to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, selecting a 
sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to 
adequately explain the chosen sentence – including an 
explanation for any deviation from the guidelines range. 
 
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).   
The District Court committed no procedural errors in this case.  The record 
indicates the District Court properly calculated Lucas‟s advisory guidelines range as 
twenty-four to thirty months‟ imprisonment, to be served consecutively with his state 
sentence.  The District Court also acknowledged the advisory nature of the guidelines, 
measured all arguments presented by the parties, considered the relevant factors set forth 
in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and thoroughly explained why it chose Lucas‟s sentence.  
Having found no procedural errors, we turn to whether or not the sentence 
imposed by the District Court was substantively reasonable.  “[T]he appellate court 
should consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed under an abuse-
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of-discretion standard” taking into account “the totality of the circumstances, including 
the extent of any variance from the guidelines range.”  Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.   “If the 
district court's sentence is procedurally sound, we will affirm it unless no reasonable 
sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for 
the reasons the district court provided.”  United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (en banc).  In the present matter, the District Court carefully considered the 
circumstances of Lucas‟s case and arrived at a sentence at the low end of the guidelines 
range.  This was a reasonable sentence. 
III. 
In sum, we conclude that Lucas‟s appeal does not present any nonfrivolous issues, 
as the District Court did not abuse its discretion in imposing Lucas‟s sentence.  
Accordingly, we will grant counsel‟s motion to withdraw and affirm the Judgment of the 
District Court. 
